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ABStrAct
this article develops the interrelationship between the equality and socio-economic 
rights in the Bill of rights to enhance the responsiveness of our jurisprudence to the 
mutually reinforcing patterns of poverty and inequality in South Africa. We proceed from 
the principle that rights are interdependent and interconnected, and examine the implica-
tions of this for our evolving socio-economic rights and equality jurisprudence. We argue 
that such a reading accords with the mandate of the courts to promote the foundational 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom in their interpretation of 
the Bill of rights, and advances the transformative goals of the constitution. the article 
examines how equality jurisprudence should be developed so as to be more responsive to 
material disadvantage and the values protected by socio-economic rights. thereafter, it 
examines how an equality perspective can enrich South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence 
on socio-economic rights. We demonstrate how the value of equality can be integrated 
within the model of reasonableness review developed by the constitutional court for 
evaluating positive socio-economic rights claims. Finally, some of the strategic implica-
tions of this interdependent reading of equality and socio-economic rights for developing 
a jurisprudence that facilitates the attainment of social and economic transformation in 
South Africa are considered.
i introduCtion
South Africa’s history of colonialism and apartheid has created deep pat-
terns of inequality and poverty. disadvantage in South Africa is complex 
and multifaceted. Although race has been the most evident and publicised 
marker of disadvantage in our society,2 patterns of gender equality are also 
deeply embedded in our social fabric, historically reinforced by a plethora 
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 See generally S terreblanche A History of Inequality in South Africa 1652–2000 (2002); J Seekings 
& n nattrass Class, Race, and Inequality in South Africa (2006).
2 Africans are the most impoverished segment of the population, constituting 9.% of the 2.9 
million poor in South Africa. united nations development Programme (undP) South Africa 
Human Development Report 2003 — The Challenge of Sustainable Development in South Africa  
Unlocking People’s Creativity (2003) 42. 
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of discriminatory customary, common law and legislative provisions.3 As 
Justice o’regan observed, ‘[t]hese patterns of discrimination are particularly 
acute in the case of black women, as race and gender discrimination overlap’.4 
Widespread structural unemployment and deep levels of poverty perpetuate 
the systemic marginalisation of particularly black women.5 other intersect-
ing axes of disadvantage include those based on HIV/AIdS status, disability, 
sexual orientation and nationality.
Since the inception of democracy in South Africa in 994, the government 
has made important advances in areas of social delivery and infrastructural 
development such as electrification, water, housing, education and social 
assistance. the economy has grown rapidly and social spending has assumed 
an increasingly larger share of the budget. there remain, however, several 
gaps in government social policies that result in the inadequate provision of 
people’s socio-economic rights. despite economic growth, unemployment 
has increased or at best decreased marginally6 and currently almost half of 
the population lives below the poverty line.7 A undP study based on the 
Human development Index has found that, in some respects, the conditions 
of the poor have worsened since apartheid ended. disadvantage has deepened 
in large part due to the impact of HIV/AIdS.9 In addition, the income gap 
between rich and poor remains one of the largest in the world.0 critical voices 
in civil society have argued that government has adopted an essentially neo-
liberal macro-economic policy that, while resulting in growth, has failed to 
3 F Kaganas & c Murray ‘Law and Women’s rights in South Africa: An overview’ (994) Acta 
Juridica .
4 Brink v Kitshoff NO 996 (4) SA 97 (cc) para 44. For a discussion of the intersecting gender 
and race dimensions of poverty see d Budlender Women and Men in South Africa  Five Years On 
(2002).
5 See d Budlender ‘Women and Poverty’ (2005) 64 Agenda 30.
6 the official employment statistics (as of September 2005) put the official national rate of 
employment at 27.7%. According to the expanded definition (which incorporates discouraged 
work-seekers), the unemployment rate rises to 3.9%: Statistics SA (Statistical release P020) 
Labour Force Survey (September 2005) <http://www statssa.gov.za>. unemployment statistics 
obscure significant aspects of the nature of employment in South Africa which includes the related 
phenomena of the ‘working poor’ earning very low wages, the decline in formal sector employ-
ment, and the growth of non-standard forms of employment characterised by low wages, minimal 
benefits, and no security. See J theron ‘Employment is not what it used to Be: the nature and 
Impact of the restructuring of Work in South Africa’ in E Webster & K Von Holdt (eds) Beyond the 
Apartheid Workplace (2005). 
7 4.5% of South Africans lived below the poverty line in 2002 according to the undP (note 2 above) 
4.
 Ibid 44.
9 See M Steinberg, S Johnson, G Schierhout & d ndegwa “Hitting Home” — How Households 
Cope with the Impact of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic. A Survey of Households Affected by HIV/AIDS in 
South Africa (2002); M richter ‘the right to Social Security of People Living with HIV/AIdS in 
the context of Public-Sector Provision of Highly-Active Antiretroviral therapy’ (2006) 22 SAJHR 
97.
0 By 996, the poorest quintile of the population received .5% of total income, compared to 65% 
received by the richest quintile: undP South Africa  Transformation for Human Development 
(2000) 64. Between 995 and 200 the Gini coefficient rose suggesting that income inequality is 
worsening in South Africa (undP note 2 above, 43).
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prioritise the needs and interests of the poor. there remains a substantial 
overlap between class, racial and gender inequalities. As a result, significant 
sections of the population are unable to develop to their full potential, realise 
their life plans and participate as equals in the political, economic, social and 
cultural spheres of our democracy.
Both the state and civil society acknowledge that poverty and inequality 
are among the major challenges facing South Africa in its second decade of 
democracy. the constitution is an important vehicle for ensuring that these 
challenges are addressed. It contains a detailed set of socio-economic rights 
that promise access to housing, education, water, social security, food and 
health care to everyone. It also contains a detailed equality right within a 
Bill of rights committed to the values of dignity, equality and freedom. the 
development of a vibrant jurisprudence on both equality and socio-economic 
rights has led to some important improvements for the disadvantaged and 
poor. However, there is a sense that the transformative potential of these rights 
has not been fully realised.
this article seeks to develop the interrelationship between equality and 
socio-economic rights to enhance the responsiveness of our jurisprudence to 
the mutually reinforcing patterns of poverty and inequality in South Africa. 
We examine the implications of the notion of the interdependence and inter-
connectedness of rights for our evolving socio-economic rights and equality 
jurisprudence. We argue that such a reading accords with the mandate of 
the courts to promote the foundational constitutional values of human dig-
nity, equality and freedom in their interpretation of the Bill of rights,2 and 
advances the transformative goals of the constitution.
Part II of this article examines the significance of an interdependent interpre-
tation of equality and socio-economic rights for advancing the transformative 
goals of the constitution. In Part III, we examine how the interpretation of the 
equality guarantee should be informed by the socio-economic rights provi-
sions in the Bill of rights so as to make equality more responsive to poverty. 
thereafter, in Part IV we examine how the value of equality should inform 
the interpretation of socio-economic rights to make that jurisprudence more 
responsive to systemic group-based disadvantage. We conclude by considering 
some of the strategic implications of this interdependent reading of equality 
and socio-economic rights for developing a jurisprudence that facilitates the 
attainment of social and economic transformation in South Africa.
 See eg the congress of South African trade unions (coSAtu) Accelerating Transformation  
COSATU’s Engagement with Policy and Legislative Processes during South Africa’s First Term 
of Democratic Governance (2000) 3; H Marais South Africa  Limits to Change — The Political 
Economy of Transformation (99).
2 Section 39(2). this section indicates that the courts are expected to play an active role in promot-
ing these foundational constitutional values through their interpretation of the rights in the Bill of 
rights. We are of the view that all three foundational values can elucidate important dimensions of 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence. However, in this article we focus particularly on the value of 
equality in relation to socio-economic rights. 
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ii  tranSFormative ConStitutionaliSm and the interdependenCe 
between SubStantive equality and SoCio-eConomiC rightS
South Africa’s constitution is widely described in academic literature and 
judicial decisions as ‘transformative’.3 It aims to facilitate a fundamental 
transformation in the unjust political, economic and social conditions inherited 
from our colonial and apartheid past,4 and to create a new society based on 
social justice, democracy and human rights. thus the constitution proclaims 
the founding values of South Africa to include ‘human dignity, the achieve-
ment of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms’.5 the 
dismantling of systemic forms of disadvantage and subordination in our 
post-apartheid society is central to the constitution’s transformative vision. 
this requires redressing pervasive forms of status subordination based on, for 
example, race, gender, and sexual orientation as well as systemic patterns of 
social and economic disadvantage.6
the Bill of rights recognises this transformative imperative through 
including, inter alia, a strong and detailed equality clause in s 9 as well as 
an extensive range of socio-economic rights. this constitutes an important 
acknowledgment of the significance of both group-based disadvantage and 
socio-economic barriers to the attainment of social justice. the inclusion of 
civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural rights reflects a 
commitment to the principle of the interdependency of all human rights.
the notion of the interdependence and interrelatedness of rights is a fun-
damental tenet of international human rights law.7 Its animating insight is 
that ‘values seen as directly related to the full development of personhood 
3 the description and theoretical notion of the South African constitution as a transformative con-
stitution was first developed by K Klare in his seminal article, ‘Legal culture and transformative 
constitutionalism’ (99) 4 SAJHR 46. It has also been developed specifically in relation to the 
equality right in c Albertyn & B Goldblatt ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in 
the development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality’ (99) 4 SAJHR 24 and in relation 
to socio-economic rights in S Liebenberg ‘needs, rights and transformation: Adjudicating Social 
rights’ (2006) 7 Stellenbosch LR 5. See further: d Moseneke ‘the Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial 
Lecture: transformative Adjudication’ (2002)  SAJHR 309; H Botha ‘Metaphoric reasoning and 
transformative constitutionalism (part 2)’ (2003) TSAR 20; M Pieterse ‘What do We Mean When 
We Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?’ (2005) 20 SAPL 55; AJ van der Walt ‘Legal 
History, Legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy’ (2006) 2 Fundamina ; 
P Langa ‘transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 3 Stell LR 35; S v Makwanyane 995 (3) SA 
39 (cc) para 262; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2004 (4) 490 (cc) paras 73–74; Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) 2 (cc) para 42; 
City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 () SA 7 (W) paras 5–52; Rates Action 
Group v City of Cape Town 2004 (5) SA 545 (c) para 00.
4 thus the Preamble proclaims that the constitution was adopted as the supreme law of the republic 
so as to, amongst others, ‘[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic 
values, social justice and fundamental human rights’.
5 Section (a) and s 7() of the constitution.
6 See nancy Fraser on the interrelationship between status subordination and distributional injustice 
in n Fraser & A Honneth Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange 
(2003) . 
7 See eg The Proclamation of Tehran Final Act of the International conference on Human rights 
tehran un doc A/conF 32/4 (96) art 3; Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (993) 
Part I, para 5.
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cannot be protected and nurtured in isolation’. Scott distinguishes between 
two senses of interdependence in human rights law: ‘organic’ and ‘related 
interdependence’.9 organic interdependence arises when the jurisprudence 
treats one right as incorporated within the scope of another right. the clas-
sic example is the Indian Supreme court’s incorporation of socio-economic 
rights within the scope of the right to life in art 2 of the Indian constitution.20 
related interdependence involves the question whether a civil and political 
right, for example, the right to a fair hearing, can be applied to protect a socio-
economic right such as the right to social security. In this case, the two sets 
of rights are treated as separate but complementary.2 the approach argued 
for in this article is a form of related interdependence which we term ‘inter-
pretative interdependence’. It encourages courts to consider how the values 
and purposes underpinning one right (for example equality) may be relevant 
and useful to the development of the jurisprudence under another right (for 
example socio-economic rights).
An approach to the interpretation of equality and socio-economic rights that 
acknowledges the interrelationship between these rights is also more likely to 
be responsive to the reality that the most severe forms of disadvantage are 
usually experienced as a result of an intersection between group-based forms 
of discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation. In these situations, 
systemic patterns of race, gender and other forms of group-based discrimi-
nation contribute to the poverty and marginalisation of affected groups. For 
example, the multiple forms of discrimination against people with disabilities 
are manifested in diminished access to public transport, public and private 
buildings and facilities, education and employment opportunities. As a 
result, this group is disproportionately vulnerable to poverty and economic 
marginalisation.22 For example, a lack of wheelchair ramps in public build-
ings and private places of employment for people with impaired mobility 
has a profound impact on their economic, social and cultural opportunities. 
conversely, being poor exacerbates the impact of disability discrimination in 
that this group lacks the economic resources to mitigate the impact of their 
status-based disadvantages. this reinforces the stigma and prejudice experi-
enced by groups living with disabilities.
Similarly, one cannot appreciate the nature and extent of gender inequality 
in South Africa without an understanding of how poverty and a lack of access 
to basic social services, such as potable water and health care, entrench and 
exacerbate such inequality. In evaluating a claim to such services by an impov-
 c Scott ‘the Interdependence and Permeability of Human rights norms: towards a Partial Fusion 
of the International covenants on Human rights’ (99) 27 Osgoode Hall LJ 769, 76.
9 Ibid 779–76.
20 For an illuminating discussion of this development, see S Muralidhar ‘the Indian Jurisprudence 
on Socio-Economic rights’ in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence  Emerging Trends in 
International and Comparative Law (forthcoming 997).
2 Scott (note  above) 73.
22 See t Emmett ‘disability, Poverty, Gender and race’ in B Watermeyer, L Swartz, t Lorenzo, M 
Schneider & M Priestley (eds) Disability and Social Change — A South African Agenda (2006) 
207.
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erished group of women living in a rural area of South Africa, it would be 
remiss of a court to fail to consider the disproportionate gendered impact of the 
lack of these services on women as a group. An evaluation of this impact would 
take account of the fact that in rural communities and informal settlements, 
women and girls spend much more time and energy on the collection of water 
from rivers and communal standpipes. Moreover, women also overwhelmingly 
bear responsibility for children and care for elderly and ill relatives. they are 
thus disproportionately affected by a lack of accessible health-care facilities. 
this is not to argue that poor men should not also be entitled to such services. 
on the contrary, the constitutional commitment to ensuring that ‘everyone’ has 
access to socio-economic rights and the fact that poverty is a distinct indicator 
of systemic disadvantage, should create such an entitlement in the absence of 
cogent justifications. However, in evaluating the reasonableness of the state’s 
failure to provide such services to a group,23 the impact of this omission on 
the constitutional goal of achieving racial and gender equality24 is a relevant 
factor that should inform the inquiry. Alternatively, a social programme may 
be designed in such a way that it fails to take into account the needs of differ-
ently situated groups resulting in unequal access to the benefits the programme 
offers. developing the interrelatedness between equality rights and socio-eco-
nomic rights will enable our jurisprudence to be more responsive to the ways 
in which status-based discrimination and economic deprivation intersect and 
reinforce each other.25 It also helps us to understand that poverty is not the 
result of individual blameworthiness or an inevitable consequence of some 
preordained natural economic order, but of choices about how we organise our 
society and economy and about deeply inscribed patterns of group discrimina-
tion. As Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh day argue:
Seeing the group dimensions of poverty, and the layers of rights infringements it both 
causes and reflects, strengthens the claim that there is a societal obligation to address it. 
When we look at poverty through a group-based equality lens we open up new opportuni-
ties to see that poverty is more than an individual problem, because the patterns of who is 
poor are entrenched and reflect long-standing discrimination in the society. The analytical 
risk of failing to take account of the particular effects on disadvantaged groups is that 
the nature and extent of the harm of poverty-producing measures and their potential to 
reinforce pre-existing disadvantage and compromise fundamental interests may not be 
fully appreciated. Purely individualistic and gender-, race-, and disability-neutral explana-
23 the ‘reasonableness test’, developed by the constitutional court in the cases of Government of the 
RSA v Grootboom 200 () SA 46 (cc) and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
(No 2) 2002 (5) SA 72 for evaluating the failure by the state to comply with its positive obligations 
in terms of ss 26 and 27, is discussed further in Part IV(c) below.
24 the constitution proclaims the achievement of equality and non-racialism and non-sexism as one 
of its founding values in s (a) and (b). 
25 this interdependence is not confined to equality and socio-economic rights, but also extends to 
other rights such as the right to life (s ), the right to freedom and security of the person (s 2), and 
political rights (s 9). For example, nicholas Haysom argued at the time of the drafting of the 996 
constitution in favour of the entrenchment of a minimum floor of socio-economic rights ‘to enrich 
political contest and democratic participation’ in ‘constitutionalism, Majoritarian democracy and 
Socio-Economic rights’ (992)  SAJHR 45, 46. on the interdependence between the right to life 
and socio-economic rights, see M Pieterse ‘A different Shade of red: Socio-Economic dimensions 
of the right to Life in South Africa’ (999) 5 SAJHR 372.
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tions of poverty are just too simplistic. commentary about group-based effects tells more 
of the truth of what is happening; it can show that there are qualitatively different impacts 
on certain groups; it may implicate a range of different constitutional rights and treaty 
provisions; and it can help to call into question the validity of the thesis that poverty is all 
about individual responsibility.26
We accordingly argue that our jurisprudence should take account of the 
particular and complex interaction between socio-economic deprivation 
and status-based forms of discrimination.27 this approach accords with the 
court’s injunction to interpret and understand rights in their social and his-
torical context.2
the constitutional court explicitly endorsed the interdependence and indi-
visibility of rights in Grootboom, a case concerning the right to housing, in 
the following terms:
All the rights in our Bill of rights are inter-related and mutually supporting. there can be 
no doubt that human dignity, equality and freedom, the foundational values of our society, 
are denied those who have no food, clothing or shelter. Affording socio-economic rights 
to all people therefore enables them to enjoy the other rights enshrined in chapter 2. the 
realisation of these rights is also key to the advancement of race and gender equality and the 
evolution of a society in which men and women are equally able to achieve their full potential 
… Socio-economic rights must all be read together in the setting of the constitution as a 
whole. the state is obliged to take positive action to meet the needs of those living in extreme 
conditions of poverty, homelessness or intolerable housing. their interconnectedness needs 
to be taken into account in interpreting the socio-economic rights, and in particular, in deter-
mining whether the state has met its obligations in terms of them.29
In the following two parts, we consider in greater detail the implications for 
our emerging equality and socio-economic rights jurisprudence of an inter-
pretive approach, which takes seriously the interconnectedness between these 
rights.
iii  the role oF SoCio-eConomiC rightS in inForming equality 
JuriSprudenCe
(a)  Substantive equality and material disadvantage
Equality is a foundational value of the South African constitution and must 
inform the interpretation of all rights in the Bill of rights. It is also a ‘guaran-
teed and justiciable right’.30 the equality right is closely related to many other 
26 G Brodsky & S day ‘denial of the Means of Subsistence as an Equality Violation’ (2005) Acta 
Juridica 49, 63–64.
27 nancy Fraser observes: ‘Economic issues such as income distribution have recognition subtexts: 
value patterns institutionalized in labour markets may privilege activities coded “masculine”, 
“white” and so on over those coded “feminine” and “black”. conversely, recognition issues — judg-
ments of aesthetic value, for instance — have distribution subtexts: diminished access to economic 
resources may impede equal participation in the making of art. the result can be a vicious circle 
of subordination, as the status order and the economic structure interpenetrate and reinforce each 
other.’ n Fraser ‘rethinking recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review 07, 6–. 
2 Grootboom (note 23 above) para 25. the court goes on to observe that the ‘right to be free from unfair 
discrimination, for example, must be understood against our legacy of deep social inequality.’
29 Ibid paras 23–24.
30 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (note 3 above) para 22.
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constitutional rights. thus, unfair discrimination on the ground of religion 
or culture must be understood in light of the freedom of religion, belief and 
opinion right in s 5 of the constitution. Gender-based violence, prohibited 
in terms of the right to freedom and security of the person in s 2, is closely 
linked to unfair gender discrimination. Section 9(2) makes particular refer-
ence to equality’s relationship to other rights: ‘equality includes the full and 
equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms’. Whenever a court is faced with a 
claim by a disadvantaged group for equal access to a state benefit or resource, 
the court must be mindful of the socio-economic rights that entitle all people 
to have access to the relevant social goods.
South Africa’s equality jurisprudence emphasises the need to address an 
historic legacy of ‘systemic inequality and disadvantage’.3 the court has 
said that the equality right is remedial and restitutionary.32 It has also pointed 
to the persistent ‘social and economic disparities’ that must be addressed 
if the commitment of the constitution is to be realised.33 Klare explains 
that the constitution contains a ‘pervasive and overriding commitment to 
equality, specifically comprehending a substantive (redistributive), not just 
formal, conception of equality’.34 He defines substantive equality as ‘equal-
ity in lived, social and economic circumstances and opportunities needed 
to experience human self-realization’.35 Albertyn and Goldblatt suggest 
that equality involves ‘the eradication of systemic forms of domination and 
material disadvantage … towards the development of opportunities which 
allow people to realise their full human potential within positive social 
relationships’.36
Substantive equality thus requires a dismantling of structural inequality 
and necessarily focuses on patterns of group-based disadvantage, rather 
than seeing discrimination as an individual infraction in an otherwise equal 
social order. It allows for measures that may appear to ‘unequally’ privilege 
a particular group, but are provided to address that group’s disadvantaged 
position in the society.37 Substantive equality also contains a forward look-
ing vision of a society where people are provided with the resources and the 
3 Brink v Kitshoff (note 4 above) paras 40–44. 
32 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 999 () SA 2 (cc) para 
6.
33 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (note 3 above) para 23.
34 Klare (note 3 above) 53–54. 
35 Ibid.
36 See Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 3 above) 249.
37 the court has expressly adopted the term ‘substantive equality’ (in National Coalition for Gay 
and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice note 32 above para 6) and has given it this meaning (in 
President of the RSA v Hugo 997 (4) SA  (cc) para 4).
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opportunities to develop, participate and flourish equally as human beings.3 
Substantive equality is intimately linked to socio-economic rights since these 
rights are premised on the need to facilitate improved access to resources and 
services necessary for a fulfilled human existence. Only when black people in 
our country have access to meaningful education and adequate housing, for 
example, will the evils of Bantu education and apartheid urbanisation policies 
be addressed. Many other legacies of inequality will need to be eroded if all 
our people are to flourish in a society based on substantive equality (together 
with dignity and freedom). thus, the South African constitution embraces a 
vision of a society where social justice and equality are intertwined. Fredman 
demonstrates (through a discussion of the Khosa and Van Heerden cases) how 
the existence of socio-economic rights in the South African constitution has 
allowed for the development of substantive equality in a way that is less pos-
sible in jurisdictions where these socio-economic rights do not exist (such as 
canada and the uK).39
A key development in South Africa’s equality jurisprudence has been the 
location of the value of dignity at the centre of the equality right. this has led 
to a concern that dignity may be interpreted narrowly to focus on harm to 
personality rights and could detract from the use of equality rights to redress 
material and systemic forms of disadvantage.40 A transformative conception of 
dignity is necessary if the equality right is to address the conditions of poverty 
that constrain people’s development and participation in our new democracy. 
As Brodsky and day argue, discrimination is not only about stereotyping, but 
can arise when disadvantaged groups are denied the social support necessary 
to survive and participate in society.4 the courts have sometimes given a 
more individualistic and personality-linked meaning to dignity that seems 
to limit its scope.42 However, in a small number of cases a wider and more 
3 While there is general agreement on the more ‘remedial’ dimensions of substantive equality and 
how it must be distinguished from a formal notion of equality, there is less clarity or commonality 
on what its vision of an equal society means. In Hugo, Goldstone J referred to the goal of ‘a society 
which affords each human being equal treatment on the basis of equal worth and freedom’ (ibid 
para 4). In this article we argue that substantive equality must include the material and redistribu-
tive dimensions suggested by Klare and others. For further discussion of the aims of substantive 
equality see S Fredman ‘Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the Positive duty to Provide’ 
(2006) 2 SAJHR 63, 67. Fredman identifies four specific aims of substantive equality: to break 
the cycle of disadvantage; to promote respect for equal dignity and worth; to affirm identity within 
community; to facilitate full social participation. Also see G Brodsky & S day ‘Beyond the Social 
and Economic rights debate: Substantive Equality Speaks to Poverty’ (2002) 4 Canadian Journal 
of Women and the Law 4.
39 Fredman ibid 0.
40 As discussed in Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 3 above) 256–260. Also see c Albertyn & B Goldblatt 
‘Equality’ in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2 ed 2007) 35, –3.
4 Brodsky & day (note 26 above) 56–64. on the potential of developing a more expansive notion 
of human dignity that is responsive to conditions of material disadvantage, see S cowen ‘can 
dignity Guide our Equality Jurisprudence’ (200) 7 SAJHR 34; S Liebenberg ‘the Value of 
Human dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic rights’ (2005) 2 SAJHR .
42 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 40 above) 9–0.
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substantive interpretation of human dignity has been given.43 the Khosa case 
(discussed below) used the value of dignity within the unfair discrimination 
enquiry to show material impact on the immigrant group as well as the harm 
to the group from which they were required to seek support as ‘supplicants’.44 
dignity, alongside the value of equality, is capable of being (and should be) 
developed as an important interpretive vehicle for a substantive understand-
ing of equality.45
(b) Unfair discrimination
the constitutional court’s focus on impact, context, purpose and values in 
determination of unfair discrimination means that this examination is more 
amenable to the goal of substantive equality.46 the criteria for considering 
fairness within the court’s unfair discrimination enquiry47 are all relevant 
to detecting patterns of socio-economic disadvantage. thus an awareness 
of socio-economic deprivations may be central to the consideration of the 
group’s position in society and whether its members suffered past patterns of 
disadvantage. In considering the nature of the provision and its purpose, an 
awareness of socio-economic rights may be important where the purpose of 
a particular law was aimed at undoing past discrimination that had resulted 
in material harm. The final leg of the fairness test looks at the impact of the 
discriminatory conduct or omissions on the rights or interests of the com-
plainants, and their human dignity. this should include a consideration of the 
impact of the discrimination on the socio-economic rights of the complainant 
group in appropriate cases. It should also incorporate an analysis of the extent 
to which the discrimination creates or perpetuates socio-economic disadvan-
tage and marginalisation for the affected groups.
the s 36 limitations analysis that follows an unfair discrimination enquiry 
may also require that the equality right and relevant socio-economic rights be 
taken into account in considering whether a right may be limited. this might 
arise where a government policy is found to be unfair discrimination and in 
justifying its measure, the government argues that it was reasonable to limit a 
person’s equality right for financial reasons (as was argued by the state in the 
Khosa case). the court should take account of other rights, including socio-
economic rights, implicated in the case at this justification stage (as well as 
earlier in its equality test).
43 the cases of City Council of Pretoria v Walker 99 (2) SA 363 (cc) and Hoffmann v South African 
Airways 2000 () SA  (cc) also addressed material issues through the equality right.
44 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 
505 (cc) para 76.
45 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 40 above) 4.
46 c Albertyn ‘Substantive Equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 253, 
25–260 argues that the constitutional court’s jurisprudence on substantive equality in South 
Africa contains four necessary elements. these are: a focus on context; attention to the impact of 
discrimination on the person complaining of it; an understanding of positive value of difference and 
diversity; and, the purpose of the right to equality and its underlying values in remedying systemic 
subordination and disadvantage. 
47 See Harksen v Lane NO 99 () SA 300 (cc) para 3.
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the Khosa case was the first to explore the relationship between the equal-
ity right and a socio-economic right when considering a claim by permanent 
residents to social assistance grants.4 the case illustrated that where govern-
ment was providing necessary social benefits, it could be forced to extend 
the reach of these benefits to exclude disadvantaged groups. The Court was 
willing to interrogate issues of affordability and decide that the government 
was required to allocate resources for this purpose.49 the judgment recog-
nised that the case concerned ‘intersecting rights which reinforce one another 
at the point of intersection’.50 In this case, the court found that equality was 
‘implicit’ since the word ‘everyone’ in the right to social security meant that 
state provision could not result in the exclusion of any group. the court stated 
that: ‘those who are unable to survive without social assistance are equally 
desperate and equally in need of such assistance.’5
When considering whether the permanent residents had suffered unfair dis-
crimination, the court was mindful of the strained economic circumstances 
of the group. In considering the state’s argument that the self-sufficiency of 
immigrants is an important policy consideration to avoid such people becom-
ing a burden on the state, the court observed that such a policy might not 
be flawless and that certain permanent residents may at some point become 
a burden on the state. But, said the judge, this ‘may be a cost we have to 
pay for the constitutional commitment to developing a caring society, and 
granting access to socio-economic rights to all who make their homes here’.52 
In considering whether the policy to exclude permanent residents was unfair 
discrimination, the court highlighted the various forms of vulnerability 
that the group faced as a political minority, as a stigmatised group and as 
a group facing poverty and lack of economic opportunities. the court held 
that this exclusion constituted both unfair discrimination on the ground of 
citizenship and a violation of the right to social security, neither of which 
were justifiable. Mokgoro J noted that the legislation in question limited the 
rights of the applicants ‘in a manner that affects their dignity and equality in 
material respects’.53 the linkages between poverty and equal citizenship were 
eloquently described in the following passage in the judgment:
Sharing responsibility for the problems and consequences of poverty equally as a commu-
nity represents the extent to which wealthier members of the community view the minimal 
well-being of the poor as connected with their personal well-being and the well-being of 
the community as a whole. In other words, decisions about the allocation of public benefits 
represent the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of society. (footnotes 
omitted)54
4 note 44 above. For a critical discussion of this decision see d Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental 
Rights  The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 70–77.
49 Khosa ibid para 62.
50 Ibid para 4.
5 Ibid para 42.
52 Ibid para 65.
53 Ibid para 5.
54 Ibid para 74.
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Section 9(3) contains a long and non-exhaustive list of grounds of unfair dis-
crimination. the equality right could possibly be used to support a claim by 
a group of poor people for benefits that would improve their position (relative 
to those who are in a better economic position). Where such a claim relates 
to benefits incorporated in one of the socio-economic rights, the equality and 
socio-economic rights claims would be mutually reinforcing. Where there was 
no such overlap, the existence of socio-economic rights would still inform such 
a claim as they would point to the general constitutional promise of social and 
economic redress. one of the listed grounds of unfair discrimination is ‘social 
origin’. While this ground has not been considered by our courts, it may be 
relevant in a discrimination claim by a group defining itself on the basis of its 
disadvantaged class position. the caste system in India is an obvious example 
of social stratification leading to an economic hierarchy. The history of racial 
capitalism in South Africa has led to the creation of distinct classes whose 
economic position has been significantly mediated by race.55 It is possible that 
a poor community might approach the court for example, for an exemption 
from paying toll fees where the road near their township is otherwise inac-
cessible. Such a claim could be based on the argument that requiring toll fees 
unfairly discriminates against them on the ground of social origin.
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of unfair discrimination Act 
includes a set of listed grounds of unfair discrimination that mirror those in 
the Bill of rights,56 as well as five additional grounds to be considered for 
inclusion by the Equality review committee, a body set up in terms of the 
Act.57 One of these is ‘socio-economic status’, defined as including ‘a social or 
economic condition or perceived condition of a person who is disadvantaged 
by poverty, low employment status or lack of or low-level educational quali-
fications’.5 While this ground has not yet been used,59 its existence points to 
the possibility that cases will be brought by poor people as a group and that 
such cases might raise claims based both on the existence of discrimination 
and the need for positive measures to address their conditions. the ground 
of socio-economic status is most likely to be used to address issues of stere-
otyping of the poor, such as in cases of ‘red lining’ where banks refuse to give 
loans to people who live in certain ‘poorer’ areas. this would be valuable 
in addressing poverty as a source of stigma.60 But it may also be used in the 
55 our equality right also allows for claims based on indirect discrimination. this may be important 
in cases where race is masked by geographical location or land ownership or other categories that 
reflect the overlap between race and poverty, particularly arising from our apartheid history. See 
City Council of Pretoria v Walker (note 44 above).
56 Act 4 of 2000. See c Albertyn, B Goldblatt & c roederer (eds) Introduction to the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (200).
57 Section 34.
5 Section .
59 the status of these grounds is currently unclear and most of the Equality court decisions are not 
reported.
60 M Jackman ‘constitutional contact with the disparities in the World: Poverty as a Prohibited 
Ground of discrimination under the canadian charter and Human rights Law’ (994) II Review of 
Constitutional Studies 76.
346 (2007) 23 SAJHR
more redistributive sense to ground a claim for benefits to address the poverty 
facing a particular group.6
The Court has said that there can also be discrimination on ‘unspecified’ 
grounds that, like the listed grounds, serve to ‘categorise, marginalize and 
often oppress persons who have had, or have been associated with, these 
attributes and characteristics’.62 the courts have been prepared to develop 
new grounds such as citizenship and HIV-status to accommodate groups 
not directly covered by the list in s 9(3). It seems possible that the ground of 
‘class’, used to found a claim by a group of poor people, could be recognised 
as an unspecified ground of unfair discrimination. Where a claim for serv-
ices is brought by a group of poor people, the court may prefer to adjudicate 
the claim under the relevant socio-economic right. For example, a claim for 
poverty relief might be brought by a group of able-bodied adults who do not 
qualify for any of the existing social assistance grants which are provided 
only to children, the elderly and the disabled. However, where poverty cre-
ates an inequality that is not easily accommodated within the scope of the 
socio-economic rights included in the constitution, the courts might be will-
ing to view such a claim in terms of class inequality. As discussed above, the 
existence of socio-economic rights in the constitution might support such 
a claim since they help to realise the constitution’s general commitment to 
social justice, the improvement of the quality of life for all and the freeing of 
the potential of each person.63 thus, for example, none of the socio-economic 
rights adequately covers the right of parents to state-provided child-care. 
child-care is as basic a need as housing and health care since, without it, care 
givers do not have the time or opportunity to meet many of their other basic 
needs (such as to collect water, grow food, access health-care or education). 
the lack of child-care facilities in the public and private sector perpetuates 
the patterns of unequal gender relations in our society. the equality right may 
prove important in supporting positive rights to material goods or services 
where such claims cannot be easily accommodated within the scope of the 
existing socio-economic rights. An interdependent and transformative inter-
pretation of the constitution would allow for the development of the equality 
right as requiring measures to address poverty.
In addition, s 9(3) provides for the possibility of multiple listed and unlisted 
grounds arising in a single claim. Grounds may also overlap or ‘intersect’ 
leading to new forms of discrimination. Justice Sachs gives the example of dis-
crimination of black foreigners that white foreigners or black South Africans 
might not experience.64 A group of poor women might claim that they face 
unfair discrimination in accessing certain services because they do not have 
access to child-care. they would argue that the unequal gender relations that 
6 Jackman raises some of the difficulties that might be encountered in arguing for poverty as a ground 
of discrimination (ibid 20). She nevertheless argues that recognising poverty in this way is a neces-
sary step towards recognising poverty as a basic human rights issue.
62 Harksen v Lane NO (note 47 above) para 49.
63 See the Preamble of the constitution.
64 NCGLE v Minister of Justice (note 32 above). See Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 40 above) 5–52.
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locate them as carers, coupled with their lack of economic resources to obtain 
child-care, combine to deepen their disadvantage. Here, the ground of class or 
poverty, as it intersects with gender, could be used in a s 9(3) claim.
(c) Positive measures
Section 9(2) of the equality right allows the state to take positive measures 
‘designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvan-
taged by unfair discrimination’ to promote the achievement of equality.65 
Section 9(2) also states that: ‘Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment 
of all rights and freedoms.’ the relationship between the two statements sup-
ports an interdependent interpretation of positive measures that takes account 
of the nature and purpose of the socio-economic rights elsewhere in the Bill 
of rights. In the leading constitutional court case on this sub-section, Van 
Heerden, the court signalled clear support for the robust use of s 9(2), saying: 
‘Absent a positive commitment progressively to eradicate socially constructed 
barriers to equality and to root out systematic or institutionalised under-privi-
lege, the constitutional promise of equality… must … ring hollow.’66
this case is important in interpreting the equality right expansively to 
facilitate the state’s efforts to undo systemic disadvantage.67 the majority 
in Van Heerden found that if a measure complies with the requirements of 
s 9(2) it cannot constitute unfair discrimination and there is thus no further 
examination of s 9 (nor, it seems, is there a limitations enquiry under s 36). 
Like socio-economic rights, justificatory and rights issues are built into the 
same enquiry.6 Mokgoro J, in a minority judgment, argued for care to be 
taken in determining which measures fall within the scope of s 9(2) so that it 
is not used in circumstances for which it was not intended. She explained that 
improper use of s 9(2) could potentially lead to unfair discrimination.69
the high level of deference accorded to state action in this context may 
result in a state remedial programme surviving constitutional challenge where 
s 9(2) is relied on to defend the extending of benefits to one disadvantaged 
group rather than to another less disadvantaged group. the Van Heerden case 
was based on a claim by an historically disadvantaged group (black people) 
versus an historically advantaged group (white people). Sachs J, in a minority 
judgment in the case, noted that the court had not had to address the ‘more dif-
ficult problem’ where a measure advances the interests of one disadvantaged 
65 the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of unfair discrimination Act (note 56 above) contains a 
range of measures for the promotion of equality by the state and the private sector and requires spe-
cial measures including codes of practice, reasonable accommodation, action plans etc to promote 
equality. the Act has only been operational for a few years so it is difficult to assess its impact but 
it offers great opportunities for far-reaching change. 
66 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden (note 3 above) para 3. 
67 See Fredman (note 3 above) 2–5 for a discussion of the case. See also Albertyn & Goldblatt 
(note 40 above) 29–42.
6 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 40 above) 42.
69 Van Heerden (note 3 above) paras 6–9.
34 (2007) 23 SAJHR
group over those of another disadvantaged group.70 An example of such a case 
might be where the state introduces a law allowing HIV-positive women to 
be given free nutritious food. In this instance, poor women who are not HIV 
positive and poor men who are either HIV positive or HIV negative might 
claim that such a law unfairly discriminates against them and is not a reason-
able measure in the sense that it deepens their disadvantage. the state might 
answer this claim by saying it is a positive measure designed to address the 
needs of a severely disadvantaged group. the groups of men and women who 
fall outside of this measure might also argue that their right to have access to 
sufficient food in s 27(1)(b), read with s 27 (2), has been violated.
This is a ‘difficult problem’ given the deferential nature of the Van Heerden 
test and its focus on the group being advantaged rather than the group oppos-
ing the measure. It uses only a ‘light brush of reasonableness’ rather than the 
stricter test of fairness that s 9(3) requires in relation to the group complaining 
of disadvantage.7
While very poor men and HIV-negative women may be less disadvantaged 
than poor HIV-positive women, they may nevertheless be desperately hungry 
and in urgent need of food. The attempt to benefit a disadvantaged group 
should not be used to justify failing to assist other disadvantaged groups. the 
state’s argument justifies a hierarchy of disadvantage, which is not supported 
by the entitlement in s 27 of ‘everyone’ to have access to sufficient food. An 
interdependent reading of s 9 and s 27 should support a result that extends 
state support to a larger section of the poor rather than limiting it to its existing 
reach. this accords with a transformative interpretation of the constitution 
and a substantive approach to equality.
the case also points to the need to understand the position of the group of 
poor men and HIV-negative women ‘intersectionally’. thus, it is incorrect 
simply to look at the ground of gender and to compare men and women. the 
disadvantage faced by the men is based on the intersection of their gender 
and their poverty. While men may be generally better off than women, these 
men remain deeply disadvantaged as a group. Similarly, for the HIV-negative 
women it would not be enough to look at their HIV status as they are also 
defined by their disadvantaged position as women and as part of the class of 
poor people.
It may be necessary for the court to develop a less deferential approach 
to s 9(2) cases where both groups are disadvantaged (if not equally so). the 
existence of a concurrent claim based on socio-economic rights should be an 
important factor in the level of scrutiny developed for such circumstances. As 
argued in Part IV (e) below, situations where a vulnerable group lacks access 
to a basic socio-economic need require particularly compelling justifications 
from the state. The basic obligation affirmed in the socio-economic rights 
cases discussed below is that the state should provide relief to those whose 
needs are urgent or who are living in intolerable conditions.
70 Ibid para 49.
7 Albertyn & Goldblatt (note 40 above) 40.
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In conclusion, the equality right, if interpreted substantively and understood 
in relation to the socio-economic rights in the constitution, can be used to 
address the needs of the disadvantaged and poor in a range of ways. First, the 
right can be used to require government benefits available to certain groups to 
be extended to other disadvantaged groups. Second, it can be used to prevent 
government from taking away benefits because of the systemic inequality 
it will perpetuate and the disadvantage that this will produce. third, it can 
be used to require that the state provide new services or benefits that will 
improve the circumstances of a disadvantaged group. the latter situation is 
illustrated by the canadian case of Eldridge where the provincial govern-
ment of British columbia was required to provide sign language interpreters 
for deaf patients as part of the publicly funded health-care system.72 In the 
following section, we examine how an equality perspective can enrich our 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence.
iv the role oF equality in SoCio-eConomiC rightS JuriSprudenCe
(a) An equality-sensitive approach to socio-economic rights claims
there has been a debate in the academic literature concerning the extent to 
which the value of equality can assist the development of the court’s jurispru-
dence on socio-economic rights. certain authors have argued that the court’s 
socio-economic jurisprudence can be understood as a particular manifestation 
of substantive equality in that it focuses on the reasonableness of the exclusion 
of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups from social provisioning in spheres 
such as housing, health-care, social security.73 others have argued that equal-
ity cannot guide South Africa’s socio-economic jurisprudence in that it is a 
comparative notion providing no substantive standard against which to meas-
ure whether there has been adequate fulfilment of socio-economic rights.74
As argued above, we understand substantive equality in the light of the 
transformative commitments of our constitution. this entails a process of 
‘constitutional enactment, interpretation and enforcement’ aimed at promoting, 
amongst other goals, a more egalitarian society.75 this includes developing a 
jurisprudence on both equality and socio-economic rights that seeks to reduce 
inequalities in people’s access to socio-economic services and resources. 
72 Eldridge v Attorney General of British Columbia (997) 5 dLr (4th) 577 (Scc).
73 See t roux ‘Legitimating transformation: Political resource Allocation in the South African 
constitutional court’ (2003) 0 Democratization 92, 97; P de Vos ‘Grootboom, the right of Access 
to Housing and Substantive Equality as contextual Fairness’ (200) 7 SAJHR 25; B Porter ‘the 
crisis of ESc rights and Strategies for Addressing It’ in J Squires, M Langford & B thiele (eds) 
The Road to a Remedy  Current Issues in the Litigation of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(2005) 43, 6. 
74 See, for example, A van der Walt ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of Social 
Justice’ in H Botha, A van der Walt, J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative 
Constitution (2004) 63, 74–76; d Bilchitz (note 4 above) 67–70. Bilchitz argues that in 
order for substantive equality to provide meaningful guidance in our evolving socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence, it must provide an account of what must be equalised (welfare, resources or 
capabilities) (fn 35, 69).
75 Klare (note 3 above) 50.
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Integrating the value of equality in our socio-economic rights jurisprudence 
is also justified in the light of the historical experience of oppression and sub-
ordination in the colonial and apartheid periods. the construction of systemic 
political, economic and social inequalities lay at the heart of the colonial and 
apartheid order.76 Its legacy is still very much with us. It is manifest in the 
racialised geography and unequal provision of services characterising South 
African towns and cities, the vastly inferior quality of education experienced 
by black children in informal settlements in urban areas and in rural areas, 
and in the inadequate, overtaxed public health-care system serving mainly 
poor black patients, compared to a highly resourced private health-care 
system serving mainly middle-income to wealthy communities. Given this 
historical and social context, our jurisprudence on socio-economic rights will 
be impoverished by neglecting the constitutional value of equality.
Furthermore, an interpretative approach to socio-economic rights which 
integrates the value of equality has significant advantages. An approach to 
socio-economic rights that is blind to the disparate ways in which a lack of 
access to social services and economic resources affect different groups, and 
the consequent need for remedial programmes which take account of these 
differences, will curtail the transformative potential of our socio-economic 
rights jurisprudence. We highlighted in Part II the differential impact of a 
lack of access to water and health-care services on poor women and how this 
deepens gendered patterns of disadvantage in South Africa. An equality per-
spective alerts us to the fact that socio-economic programmes may be designed 
or implemented in such a way that they exclude or are practically inaccessible 
for disadvantaged groups. Examples would be a housing programme which 
failed to make provision for the housing needs of women seeking refuge from 
abusive partners, or a public works programme that fails to make provision for 
child-care thus restricting women’s ability to participate in this programme. 
An understanding of the interconnections between poverty and other forms 
of group disadvantage is thus necessary to ensure that programmes which are 
designed to extend access to socio-economic rights benefit all groups equally. 
It also avoids the false impression that the poor are a homogenous group with 
uniform experiences of injustice and socio-economic needs.
Finally, without sensitivity to the value of equality, well-meaning socio-eco-
nomic programmes can end up stigmatising and perpetuating discriminatory 
value judgments based on grounds such as race, gender and sexual orientation. 
For example, child support grant programmes may be designed to incorporate 
restrictive eligibility criteria and sanction state surveillance of care-givers. 
this reinforces public images of poor women (who in the South African 
context remain predominantly black) as irresponsible dependants on public 
welfare. Public policies and jurisprudence upholding such programmes serve 
76 S terreblanche (note  above); J Seekings & n nattrass (note  above).
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to fuel the powerful undercurrents of gender- and poverty-based stereotypes 
in our society.77
(b)  The Court’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence
the constitutional court has developed its jurisprudence on socio-eco-
nomic rights in a series of landmark cases.7 It has affirmed that both the 
negative and positive duties imposed by these rights are justiciable. A dif-
ferential model of review has been developed in relation to these respective 
duties.79
Situations where individuals or groups are deprived of existing access to 
socio-economic rights are characterised as a violation of the negative obliga-
tion imposed by the rights.0 this constitutes a limitation to the relevant right, 
which can only be justified in terms of the stringent requirements of the general 
limitations clause in s 36. Limitations to the rights in the Bill of rights must 
be in terms of a law of general application and be ‘reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and free-
dom’. The assessment of justifiability incorporates a proportionality inquiry 
which includes asking whether there are ‘less restrictive means’ available to 
achieve the state’s purposes. the foundational constitutional values are thus 
accorded a central role in assessing the justifiability of negative violations of 
socio-economic rights.
77 For a discussion of this issue in the context of the uS Supreme court decision in Wyman v James 400 
uS 309 (97), see t ross ‘the rhetoric of Poverty: their Immorality, our Helplessness’ (99) 
79 The Georgetown Law Journal 499 522–525. B Goldblatt ‘Gender and Social Assistance 
in the First decade of democracy: A case Study of South Africa’s child Support Grant’ (2005) 
Politikon 239 includes research on stigmatisation of women recipients of the child support grant in 
South Africa including allegations that they are deliberately having babies in order to claim grants.
7 For analyses of this jurisprudence, see: M Pieterse ‘coming to terms with Judicial Enforcement 
of Socio-Economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 33; d Brand ‘Introduction to Socio-Economic 
rights in the South African constitution’ in d Brand & c Heyns (eds) Socio-Economic Rights in 
South Africa (2005) ; S Liebenberg ‘South Africa: Adjudicating Socio-Economic rights under a 
transformative constitution’ in Langford (ed) (note 20 above).
79 there is a broader critique of the distinction between negative and positive duties and whether a 
differential model of review based on such a distinction is justified. See, for example: M craven 
‘Assessment of the Progress on Adjudication of Economic, Social and cultural rights’ in Squires et 
al (eds) note 73 above, 27, 34–36. 
0 Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2006 () SA 220 (cc), para 34. See also Grootboom (note 
23 above) para 34; TAC (note 23 above) para 46. the Jaftha case concerned a challenge to the provi-
sions of the Magistrates’ court Act which permitted poor peoples’ state-subsidised homes to be sold 
in execution for trifling debts without any form of judicial intervention. the constitutional court 
held that this constituted a negative violation of the right to housing in s 26() of the constitution, 
which the state failed to justify in terms of the general limitations clause. By way of remedy the 
court read provisions into the statute providing for judicial oversight over sales-in-execution 
against the immovable property of judgment debtors. See also the High court decision in Residents 
of Bon Vista Mansions v Southern Metropolitan Local Council 2002 (6) BcLr 625 (W).
 Section 36()(e).
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In the case of the positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights, the court 
has developed the model of ‘reasonableness’ review for assessing compliance 
by the state with its duties.2 Although not explicitly defined by the Court, the 
positive duties imposed by socio-economic rights refer to the measures which 
the state must take to ensure that individuals gain access to the services and 
resources guaranteed by the particular rights. the court has held that this 
positive duty is qualified by three key elements: ‘(a) the obligation to “take 
reasonable legislative and other measures”; (b) “to achieve the progressive 
realisation” of the right; and (c) “within available resources”.’3 the contours 
of reasonableness review were developed in the landmark cases of Govt of 
RSA v Grootboom (‘Grootboom’)4 and Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign (‘TAC’).5 this article will focus on these positive obligations and 
the model of reasonableness review.
(c)  Evaluating ‘reasonableness review’
Essentially reasonableness review seeks to preserve a margin of discretion 
for the state in selecting particular policies to give effect to socio-economic 
rights whilst retaining the courts’ jurisdiction to review whether these choices 
are consistent with the constitution.6 reasonableness review entails an assess-
ment of whether government has adopted and properly implemented a coherent, 
comprehensive and transparent7 programme that is capable of facilitating the 
realisation of the relevant rights. A central requirement of a reasonable govern-
ment programme is that it must cater for those whose needs are urgent and who 
are living in ‘intolerable conditions’.9 This element is justified particularly by 
reference to the value of human dignity and the imperative to take into account 
the situation of those in a particularly vulnerable position for whom the enjoy-
ment of all rights are imperilled.90 In Grootboom, the state’s failure to adopt and 
implement an emergency programme catering for the shelter needs of those who 
were homeless was held to be unreasonable, and hence inconsistent with s 26. 
In TAC, the failure to extend the supply of nevirapine from a limited number of 
research sites to hospitals and clinics throughout the public health sector so as 
to reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV during childbirth was held to be 
unreasonable and a violation of s 27.
2 Grootboom (note 23 above) para 3; TAC (note 23 above) para 39. 
3 Grootboom (note 23 above) para 3.
4 Ibid.
5 note 23 above. 
6 Grootboom (note 23 above) para 4.
7 the transparency of government social programmes was referred to as a relevant criterion in evalu-
ating reasonableness in the TAC case (note 23 above) para 23.
 Grootboom (note 23 above) paras 39–44.
9 Ibid paras 6, 99.
90 Ibid paras 44, 3; TAC (note 23 above) paras 6, 70.
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critics of the model of reasonableness review have focused particularly on the 
court’s failure to adopt the concept of minimum core obligations endorsed by 
the un committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights.9 the committee 
does not develop a particular standard for specifying the content of the mini-
mum core, referring only to the duty incumbent on state parties ‘to ensure the 
satisfaction of minimum essential levels of each of the rights’.92 david Bilchitz 
argues that minimum core obligations in relation to socio-economic rights arise 
from the urgent interests which people have in survival.93 He argues that people 
also have a more maximal interest ‘in the general conditions that are necessary 
for the fulfilment of a wide range of purposes’.94 However, the urgency of the 
former interest creates an obligation on the state to prioritise its fulfilment.95 A 
related critique is that reasonableness review lacks content and is in danger of 
becoming an excessively deferential standard of review which will not advance 
the transformative goals of the constitution.96 thus davis argues that a court 
can ‘mould the concept of reasonableness so that, on occasion, it resembles a 
test for rationality’ thereby allowing it to ‘give a wide berth to any possible 
engagement with direct issues of socio-economic policy’.97
the jurisprudence suggests that reasonableness review has developed into 
a context-sensitive standard which incorporates a number of substantive cri-
teria and values for assessing the state’s compliance with its positive duties. 
9 the notion of ‘minimum core obligations’ was initially adopted by the un committee in General 
comment no 3 (Fifth session, 990) The Nature of States Parties Obligations (art 2(1) of the 
Covenant) un doc E/99/23, para 0. It has been elaborated upon in subsequent General 
comments, see General comment no 4 (twenty-second session 2000) The Right to the Highest 
Attainable Standard of Health (art 12 of the Covenant) un doc E/c2/2000/4, para 43; General 
comment no 5 (twenty-ninth session, 2002) The Right to Water (arts 11 and 12 of the Covenant) 
un doc E/c.2/2002/, paras 37–3. 
92 General comment no 3 ibid para 0.
93 See Bilchitz (note 4 above) 7–. See also d Bilchitz ‘towards a reasonable Approach to the 
Minimum core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-Economic rights Jurisprudence’ (2003) 
9 SAJHR . 
94 Bilchitz (note 4 above) .
95 Ibid 9. on the notion of priority and the minimum core, see 20–23. 
96 d Brand ‘the Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic rights Jurisprudence, or “What 
are Socio-Economic Rights For?”’ in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and 
Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2004) 33; d davis ‘Socio-Economic rights in South 
Africa: the record of the constitutional court after ten Years’ (2004) ESR Review 3; M Pieterse 
‘coming to terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic rights’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 33 
40–4. reasonableness review has also been defended as an appropriate model of review and 
preferable to the minimum core approach to socio-economic rights claims. See, for example: M 
Wesson ‘Grootboom and Beyond: reassessing the Socio-Economic Jurisprudence of the South 
African constitutional court’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 24; c Steinberg ‘can reasonableness Protect the 
Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 SALJ 264; K 
Lehmann ‘In defense of the constitutional court: Litigating Socio-Economic rights and the Myth 
of the Minimum core’ (2006) 22 Am U Int L Rev 63. 
97 davis ibid 5. 
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Grootboom, TAC and their progeny have resulted in the adoption of or exten-
sion of important social programmes in favour of the poor.9
nevertheless, the danger that reasonableness review can degenerate 
into an excessively deferential or formal standard of review cannot be 
discounted.99 Given the court’s commitment to reasonableness review for 
evaluating positive socio-economic rights claims,00 it becomes important to 
ensure that reasonableness review develops a sufficiently substantive con-
tent which can advance the transformative aims of the constitution. one of 
the ways in which this can be achieved is to develop the role of the founda-
tional constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom as well 
as the impact of socio-economic deprivations on other intersecting rights 
within the assessment of reasonableness. As we have noted, the value of 
dignity has already been given an important place in the court’s assessment 
of reasonableness.0 However, given the deep intersections between socio-
economic deprivations and race, gender and other forms of inequality in 
South Africa, the value of equality within reasonableness review warrants 
further development.02 In our view, the temptation to seek to justify socio-
economic rights in terms of one overarching value or related right should 
be resisted. Such an approach is too restrictive and does not do justice to 
the range of values and fundamental interests which socio-economic rights 
were intended to promote in different contexts. Even the seeming clarity 
offered by standards such as ‘survival’ for justifying minimum core obliga-
tions is illusory and does not do justice to the diversity of different contexts 
and circumstances in which socio-economic rights claims are made. As 
Katharine Young observes:
[t]he focus on biological survival can set the interpretations of economic and social rights 
on the wrong ground. A focus on needs may disclose little about the ranking of alternative 
strategies designed to save lives, and is unhelpful in a mature recognition of the inevitability 
9 there was a delay of over three years subsequent to the Grootboom judgment before the state 
adopted a programme for housing assistance in emergency housing circumstances. this programme 
now constitutes chapter 2 of the national Housing code. the implications of the non-imple-
mentation of this programme by local authorities in eviction applications were considered in the 
following cases: City of Cape Town v Rudolph 2004 (5) SA 545 (c); The City of Johannesburg v 
Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd (note 3 above); City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (Pty) Ltd 2007 
ScA 25 (rSA) (at the date of writing the latter case has been appealed to the constitutional court 
and judgment is awaited). For an account of the role of the court’s socio-economic rights jurispru-
dence in the campaign for the adoption of national HIV/AIdS treatment Plan, see M Heywood 
‘Shaping, Making and Breaking the Law in the campaign for national HIV/AIdS treatment Plan’ 
in P Jones & K Stokke (eds) Democratising Development  The Politics of Socio-Economic Rights 
in South Africa (2005) .
99 See also the discussion by B Porter ‘the crisis of ESc rights and Strategies for Addressing It’ in 
Squires et al (eds) (note 73 above) 43, 62. 
00 In both Grootboom and TAC, the constitutional court has rejected arguments by amici curiae to 
adopt the concept of minimum core obligations. See Grootboom (note 23 above) paras 26–33; TAC 
(note 23 above) paras 26–39. 
0 See, for example, Grootboom ibid para 44; Khosa (note 44 above) paras 40–45.
02 A similar observation applies to the value of freedom, but the relevance of this value to socio-
economic rights claims deserves detailed consideration in a separate article. For a justification of 
socio-economic rights in terms of the value of autonomy, see c Fabre ‘constitutionalising Social 
rights’ (99) 6 The Journal of Political Philosophy 263.
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of death. Similarly, the emphasis on minimalism behind the core becomes suggestive, when 
attached to life, of a more scientific, needs-based assessment of the commodities necessary 
for biological survival.03
She goes on to point out how such technical approaches have tended to detract 
from the participatory dimensions of defining and claiming rights. This does 
not imply that the impact of socio-economic rights deprivations on people’s 
survival prospects and life chances should not be important factors in the 
assessment of reasonableness. our point is that biological survival is not 
necessarily the only or most relevant interest at stake in different kinds of 
socio-economic rights cases. For example, a claim for the provision or protec-
tion of shelter by abused women may be better understood in terms of the 
value of autonomy and freedom and security of the person. A claim by Hindu 
prisoners for the provision of vegetarian food is better justified by intersection 
of the right to food and respect for religious and cultural diversity.
The following sections focus specifically on the implications of integrating 
the value of equality within reasonableness review.
(d)  Integrating the value of equality in reasonableness review
The jurisprudence to date suggests that the key factors influencing the assess-
ment of reasonableness are a combination of the vulnerability of the group 
experiencing the deprivation, and the nature of the service or resource to 
which access is sought in the particular case. In Grootboom, the claimants 
were representative of impoverished communities ‘who have no access to 
land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions or 
crisis situations’.04 they were seeking access to basic, emergency shelter until 
such time that their needs could be provided for within the formal housing 
programme. these were critical factors informing the court’s assessment that 
the state’s housing programme in the area of the cape Metropolitan council 
failed to comply with s 26 of the constitution.05 In the TAC case, the govern-
ment’s restrictive programme to prevent mother-to-child transmission of HIV 
was unreasonable because impoverished women and their children, who were 
dependant on state-provided health-care services, were deprived of access to 
‘a simple, cheap and potentially lifesaving medical intervention’.06 In Khosa, 
the court emphasised the vulnerable position of permanent residents living 
in poverty and the severe impact on their dignity of denying them access to 
social assistance grants.07 the purpose of such grants, according to the court, 
is to ensure that people ‘are afforded their basic needs’.0 the court linked 
03 K Young ‘the Minimum core of Economic and Social rights: A concept in Search of content’ 
(200) 33 Yale J Int’L (forthcoming) Part II A (footnotes omitted).
04 Grootboom (note 23 above) paras 3–4, 65, 99.
05 Ibid para 36.
06 TAC (note 23 above) paras 70, 73, 7–79. 
07 Khosa (note 44 above), paras 76–77, . See further the discussion in Part III (b) above.
0 Khosa ibid para 52.
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the fulfilment of basic needs to the foundational constitutional values in the 
following terms: ‘A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of 
life are accessible to all if it is to be a society in which human dignity, freedom 
and equality are foundational.’09
these factors incorporate an implicit substantive equality perspective that 
requires special consideration for the fulfilment of the basic needs of vul-
nerable and disadvantaged groups. Although the meeting of these needs will 
not result in an equal distribution of resources in society, it at least mitigates 
the impact of the existing stark economic inequalities and enables a greater 
measure of participation by marginalised groups in our society.0 Moreover, 
in accordance with the obligation of ‘progressive realisation’ in ss 26(2) and 
27(2), the state should be placed under an ongoing obligation to take reason-
able measures to improve both access to socio-economic rights as well as 
the quality of socio-economic services and resources to which disadvantaged 
groups have access. this will contribute to reducing the socio-economic 
disparities in our society. Socio-economic rights should advance both the 
meeting of basic needs and the achievement of greater equality in access to 
socio-economic services and resources. this advances one of the primary 
goals of transformative constitutionalism — the transformation of ‘a coun-
try’s political and social institutions and power relationships in a democratic, 
participatory, and egalitarian direction’.2
A jurisprudence on reasonableness which integrates a substantive equal-
ity perspective would incorporate the following inquiries: (a) the historical 
and current social context in which the claimant group is situated. (b) the 
impact of the denial of access to the relevant socio-economic resource or 
service on this group.3 In this regard, a court should inquire whether the 
socio-economic deprivation in question prevents the claimant group from 
developing to their full potential and participating as equals in society. does 
the denial of access to the particular rights have the effect of entrenching 
and perpetuating systemic patterns of racial, gender and other forms of 
discrimination and subordination in our society? Does it create new and 
09 Ibid.
0 See also the discussion on ‘positive measures’ in the context of equality rights in Part III (c) 
above.
 the court held in Grootboom in relation to the progressive realisation of the right of access to 
adequate housing in s 26: ‘Housing must be made more accessible not only to a larger number 
of people but to a wider range of people as time progresses’ (para 45). Bilchitz (note 4 above, 
93–94) critiques this interpretation of ‘progressive realisation’ on the basis that it implies ‘that 
some receive housing now, and others receive it later’. In the light of his argument that the state has 
an immediate commitment to prioritising minimum core obligations, he understands ‘progressive 
realisation’ to impose a duty on the state to gradually improve the quality of housing provision. See 
also the discussion in S Liebenberg ‘the Interpretation of Socio-Economic rights’ in Woolman et 
al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2nd ed 2004) 33, 4–44.
2 Klare (note 3 above) 50.
3 See, for example, the detailed analysis by Sachs J of the historical and social context in which 
predominantly black communities in South Africa experience evictions from their homes, and 
the economic and social consequences of such evictions in Port-Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 () SA 27 (cc) paras –23. 
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invidious forms of disadvantage based, for example, on an intersection of 
grounds such as poverty, nationality and HIV-negative status?4 (c) the 
nature of the resource or service to which access is sought. Is it accepted as 
a basic social need in South African law, comparative and international law? 
In this regard, it is relevant that the court expressly held open the possibility 
in both Grootboom and TAC of having ‘regard to the content of a minimum 
core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the State are 
reasonable’.5
Such an analysis should not be limited to the traditional group-based 
grounds of discrimination, but extend to an acknowledgement of the dis-
tinct disadvantages suffered by the poor as a group. the court has already 
acknowledged this in its jurisprudence to date. thus in Grootboom, the court 
held that the poor ‘are particularly vulnerable and their needs require special 
attention’.6 this recognition of the distinctiveness of poverty as a ground 
of systemic disadvantage should be complemented by an analysis of how it 
interrelates with other axes of discrimination in particular cases.
(e)  Justifications
one of the particular features of reasonableness review is that it combines a 
consideration of the values and purposes underpinning the relevant rights and 
the impact of their denial on the complainant group with the state’s justifica-
tions for failing to fulfil the rights. Thus the Court observed in Khosa:
When the rights to life, dignity and equality are implicated in cases dealing with socio-
economic rights, they have to be taken into account along with the availability of human and 
financial resources in determining whether the State has complied with the constitutional 
standard of reasonableness. this is, however, not a closed list and all relevant factors have to 
be taken into account in this exercise. What is relevant may vary from case to case depending 
on the particular facts and circumstances.7
the jurisprudence under ss 26 and 27 thus departs from the traditional two-
stage approach to constitutional analysis in which the scope of the relevant 
right and whether it has been infringed is determined first, and thereafter 
the justifiability of a limitation to that right is considered. This conflation of 
the two stages within the reasonableness inquiry creates the danger that the 
inquiry becomes disproportionately focused on the state’s justificatory argu-
ments. An approach which emphasises the purposes and values underpinning 
socio-economic rights and a contextual application of these values in the 
4 As Henk Botha ‘Freedom and constraint in constitutional Adjudication’ (2004) 20 SAJHR 249, 277 
observes: ‘the constitution… does not seek simply to consolidate and preserve the outcome of past 
constitutional struggles, but requires us to carry these struggles forward through political action and 
openness to new struggles for recognition.’
5 Grootboom (note 23 above) para 33; TAC (note 23 above) para 34.
6 Grootboom ibid para 36. See also TAC ibid para 70: ‘to the extent that government limits the supply 
of nevirapine to its research sites, it is the poor outside the catchment areas of these sites who will 
suffer. there is a difference in the positions of those who can afford to pay for services and those 
who cannot. State policy must take account of these differences’ (footnotes omitted). 
7 Khosa (note 44 above) para 44. See also paras 3–4 and sources cited here.
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particular case would focus the reasonableness inquiry, at least initially, on a 
value-based assessment of the context of the relevant rights and the impact of 
the socio-economic deprivation in question on the complainant group. It would 
require close attention to the historical, social, economic and political context 
in which groups experience a denial of access to socio-economic rights. this 
will help guard against reasonableness degenerating into an unprincipled and 
unduly deferential standard of review.
Where a disadvantaged group is deprived of access to a basic social or eco-
nomic resource corresponding to the rights in ss 26 and 27 and the impact of 
this deprivation is severe, the courts should require particularly compelling 
justifications from the state. A proportionality analysis should also be incor-
porated, requiring the state to consider alternative means of providing relief to 
the affected group when it is not possible within current resource constraints 
to provide all elements of the right. this strict standard of scrutiny was illus-
trated in the Khosa case where the fact that a vulnerable group of complainants 
(non-nationals) were denied access to a social grant with the effect that they 
were forced into relations of dependence on their community triggered ‘a hard 
look’ review of the state’s policy and budgetary justifications.
the standard of scrutiny should thus be informed by an understanding of 
the purposes and values underpinning the particular rights and a contextual 
analysis of the impact of the denial of the right on the complainant group. 
An incorporation of the value of equality within the reasonableness inquiry 
would demand particularly stringent justifications from the state in situations 
where the denial of access to socio-economic rights creates or reinforces pat-
terns of inequality and marginalisation in our society.
Situations may arise in particular socio-economic cases where the state 
is able to show that its resources are demonstrably inadequate to satisfy 
everyone’s basic needs. In these circumstances, it becomes reasonable to 
prioritise the urgent needs of those who are in a particularly disadvantaged 
or vulnerable position.9 one indication of this heightened vulnerability is 
where groups experience intersecting forms of disadvantage based, for exam-
ple, on race, gender and poverty. However, courts should guard against the 
danger of accepting too readily the state’s resource constraints arguments and 
the temptation to seek refuge in the creation of categories of vulnerability 
among the poor as a class. Such an approach will leave intact, and in fact serve 
to legitimate, existing distributions of wealth and the pervasive class-based 
inequalities of our society.20 It will not facilitate the transformation of our 
society in a participatory and egalitarian direction. Resource-based justifica-
 Khosa ibid paras 53–67. See further the discussion in Part III (b) above. 
9 the un committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights, which supervises states parties 
obligations under the International covenant on Economic, Social and cultural rights (966) has 
commented that ‘even in times of severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of 
adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of society can and 
indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes’. General 
comment no 3 (note 9 above) para 2.
20 on the counterproductive implications of such an approach, see Lehmann (note 96 above). 
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tions for a failure to fulfil the basic socio-economic needs of everyone should 
thus be carefully scrutinised both in relation to existing budgetary allocations 
and the holistic range of resources commanded by the state.2 If the context 
requires it, the state should be called upon to provide a reasoned justification 
why the failure to ensure the fulfilment of everyone’s socio-economic rights 
cannot be remedied through the taking of redistributive measures.
v ConCluSion
We have argued that an interpretation of equality rights and socio-economic 
rights which takes seriously the interdependence between these rights is nec-
essary to ensure that both sets of rights realise their transformative potential. 
the interrelationship between the two rights creates a number of strategic 
challenges for public interest litigation in South Africa. decisions will have to 
be made as to whether, in the light of the facts of the particular case, the con-
stitutional challenge is best brought solely on the basis of equality rights, or on 
the basis of socio-economic rights, or as a combination of the two. Where the 
state has adopted a social benefits programme or legislation which unfairly 
discriminates against or excludes a certain group on prohibited grounds, 
litigation can be initiated on the basis of a joint reading of equality and socio-
economic rights. As argued above, such an intersection of rights should trigger 
a strict standard of scrutiny in respect of the state’s justifications.
However, where the state has failed to enact social benefit programmes or 
legislation, it may be difficult to persuade a court to order the state to adopt 
such programmes solely on the basis of equality rights. Such positive measures 
stand a better chance of success when brought in terms of the socio-economic 
rights provisions of the constitution, or as a combination of a substantive 
reading of equality and socio-economic rights.
Another set of difficult cases are those where the ground of discrimination 
is primarily based on a group’s socio-economic status. this form of discrimi-
nation is endemic in a market economy where the wealthy can purchase social 
goods which the poor cannot afford, or goods of a superior quality such as 
health care, education and social security. can these inequalities be challenged 
in terms of s 9 equality rights, or should they be exclusively adjudicated in 
terms of socio-economic rights? An example that arises in the South African 
context concerns the right of ‘everyone’ to ‘social security, including, if they 
are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate social 
assistance’.22 At present South Africa has one of the most extensive social 
assistance programmes for a developing country with more than  million 
receiving one of the social grants.23 the criteria for entitlement to these grants 
2 For a discussion of the concept of ‘available resources’ in ss 26 and 27, see: Liebenberg (note  
above) 33, 44–47; Bilchitz (note 4 above) 227–234.
22 Section 27()(c) read with s 27(2) of the constitution.
23 Address by the Minister of Social development, dr Zola Skweyiya on the occasion of the debate 
on the President’s State of the nation Address, Parliament, cape town, 3 February 2007 <http://
www.welfare.gov za/media/2007/debate.htm>.
360 (2007) 23 SAJHR
are youth (under 4), old age (over 60 for women, over 65 for men) and severe 
disability. the grant system excludes many millions more very poor South 
Africans who do not fall into the aforementioned categories, but face endemic 
structural unemployment. they are thus not in a position to earn enough to 
escape poverty. Many of the individuals and families who live without grants 
are worse off than those who access grants and face dire poverty and even 
starvation. Legal arguments for the extension of existing grants such as allow-
ing children between the ages of 14 and 18 years to benefit from child support 
grants fit relatively comfortably within an equality framework. However, the 
courts may be less comfortable adjudicating a claim by able-bodied adults 
where there is no comparator other than those who are better off. Such a claim 
might be more strategically framed in terms of socio-economic rights. the 
existing jurisprudence on socio-economic rights can support such a claim by 
requiring the state to provide short-term measures of relief for those whose 
needs are urgent and to develop a transparent and participatory plan as a 
basis for the progressive realisation of the right to social security.24 However, 
even in a case such as this, an integration of an equality perspective would 
strengthen such a claim. thus, for example, a lack of a secure basic income 
deepens the disadvantages experienced by groups living with HIV/AIdS. In 
particular, the lack of social assistance prevents sick people from accessing 
existing services such as anti-retroviral programmes and adequate nutritional 
support as they often cannot afford the transport to clinics or the food that 
would complement their treatment.25
In conclusion, an interdependent interpretation of equality and socio-eco-
nomic rights has significant potential to enhance the responsiveness of our 
jurisprudence to the complex causes and manifestations of poverty and ine-
quality in South Africa. the striving to understand and respond to systemic 
disadvantage and injustice lies at the heart of transformative adjudication 
under our constitution.
24 the un committee on Economic, Social and cultural rights views the adoption of a participatory 
and transparent plan of action and strategy for the realisation of the rights as a core obligation 
of states parties to the International covenant on Economic, Social and cultural rights. See eg 
General comment no 4 (note 9 above) para 43(f).
25 See further richter (note 9 above).
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